We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C9.
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the Nash equilibria of games in strategic form generally depend upon players' risk attitudes, and that the Nash equilibria of repeated games depend upon the players' time preferences as well. A wellknown exception to the former is the class of games in which each player's attitudes is brought squarely back into the analysis of equilibrium. 5 Our results show that this belief is not correct.
Our first result is for two-player supergames. Theorem 1 establishes that if each stage game in a sequence of stage games is strictly competitive (i.e., a loss for one player is a win for the other player), then in every Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage will be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, provided that each player's von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility function over supergame outcomes is "monotone." An expected utility function u i on supergame outcomes (i.e., on sequences of stage game outcomes) is monotone if whenever two outcomes differ only at a single stage then u i assigns a higher utility to the outcome in which player i wins at that stage. In the twice-repeated O'Neill game, for example, u i is monotone if the utility of is greater than the utility of either or , and if each of these utilities is greater than the utility of . Monotonicity of preferences is a natural condition on the players' ordering of certain supergame outcomes. Our first result requires no further knowledge of the players' preferences over lotteries on supergame outcomes, such as their intertemporal preferences or their risk attitudes, requiring only that their preferences be representable by von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility functions. Applied to the repeated O'Neill game, for example, our result establishes that in the supergame's Nash equilibrium, play at each stage is the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game, regardless of players' risk attitudes or time preferences.
Our next results concern the subgame perfect equilibria of supergames with any finite number of players, consisting of the sequential play of winloss stage games. Theorem 2 establishes that if each player's utility function over supergame outcomes is monotone, then playing at each stage the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame. Theorem 3 establishes that if each stage game in the sequence has a unique Nash equilibrium and each player's utility function over supergame outcomes is monotone, then the supergame has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which, at each stage, play is the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. These results establish that a stronger solution concept (i.e., subgame perfection rather than Nash equilibrium) enlarges 5 Few studies of win-loss games acknowledge the repeated game resulting from fixed pairings, with the notable exceptions of Brown and Rosenthal (1990) , who state that the Nash equilibrium of the repeated O'Neill game consists of play at each stage of the stage game equilibrium when each player maximizes the sum of his payoffs (and who conjecture that equilibrium has this character for more general preferences), and Binmore et al. (1996) who state that since the repeated game has more than two outcomes, equilibrium play depends on the subjects' risk attitudes. the class of supergames for which equilibrium play is invariant to risk attitudes and time preferences. Together our results establish that equilibrium play is invariant for a wide class of preferences in supergames consisting of the sequential play of win-loss games.
Our first result, Theorem 1, is closely related to an important result due to Benoit and Krishna (1987) for repeated games in which the same stage game is played successively T times and in which utility is the average, or sum, of the stage game utilities. They show that if in every Nash equilibrium of the stage game each player obtains his minimax payoff, then in every Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage will be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
In contrast to our result, Benoit and Krishna (1987) employ strong restrictions on the players' preferences. The additivity of utility across stages implies that, when the stage game is a win-loss game, the players are risk neutral in the supergame (i.e., each player is indifferent between lotteries over supergame outcomes in which the expected number of wins is the same). In the twice repeated O'Neill game, for example, additivity of utility implies that every player is indifferent between the outcome and the lottery which gives or with equal probability, and that every player is also indifferent to the timing of wins and losses, i.e., ∼ . Since in every Nash equilibrium of a two-player strictly competitive win-loss game each player obtains his minimax payoff, when the stage games are win-loss games our result generalizes Benoit and Krishna's by dispensing with restrictions regarding players' risk attitudes or time preferences.
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Our results on the subgame perfect equilibria of supergames consisting of the sequential play of win-loss stage games are related to well-known results for finitely repeated games in which utility is additive across stages: (i) it is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game to play at each stage the stage game's Nash equilibrium, and (ii) if the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium then the repeated game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which play at each stage, on and off the equilibrium path, is the Nash equilibrium of the stage game (see Benoit and Krishna, 1985) . We obtain analogous results when each stage game in the sequence of stage games is a win-loss game, again without assumptions regarding the players' attitude toward risk and their time preferences.
Our last result concerns maximin play in two-player supergames consisting of the sequential play of strictly competitive win-loss stage games. Theorem 4 establishes that if a player's utility function over supergame outcomes is monotone, then the behavioral strategy which calls for maximin play at each stage is a maximin behavioral strategy, i.e., this behavioral strategy maximizes the expected payoff that a player can guarantee himself in the supergame. We also show that it is a Nash (and subgame perfect) equilibrium of the supergame when both players follow a maximin behavioral strategy of this kind. Furthermore, a player's expected payoff is the same in every Nash equilibrium of the supergame, and is equal to his maximin payoff. Hence, even though the supergame need not be equivalent to a zero-sum game, it inherits some of the properties of its constituent stage games which are.
WIN-LOSS GAMES
A win-loss game G is defined as
where N is the set of players, and for each i ∈ N, A i is player i's set of actions (or pure strategies), o i is a function mapping A = × i∈N A i to i i the set of outcomes for player i. We assume each player i prefers the outcome i to the outcome i and, when comparing two lotteries on i i , prefers the lottery in which i has higher probability. We refer to the two outcomes i and i , respectively, as a "win" and a "loss" for player i. Assume that N and A i for each i ∈ N are finite. For any finite set Z, denote by Z the set of probability distributions over Z. We denote a mixed strategy for player i as σ i ∈ A i , and we write σ i a i for the probability that player i chooses a i ∈ A i . To reduce notation, for a −i ∈ × j∈N\ i A j we sometimes write σ −i a −i for j∈N\ i σ j a j . A mixed-strategy profile is denoted by σ = σ i i∈N . A win-loss game is strictly competitive if for each a ∈ A there is some i ∈ N such that o i a = i and o j a = j for all j = i.
Although utility numbers are not specified in win-loss games, it is nonetheless unambiguous to refer to their Nash equilibria. We say that σ = σ i i∈N ∈ × i∈N A i is a Nash equilibrium if for each i ∈ N and every σ i ∈ A i ,
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium each player's strategy maximizes his probability of winning given the strategies of the other players. Two-player strictly competitive win-loss games have the property that for any assignment of utility numbers to outcomes such that each player's utility of winning is greater than his utility of losing, the resulting game is equivalent to a zero-sum game.
7 The Minimax Theorem, as it applies to two-person strictly competitive win-loss games, can be stated as follows.
be a twoperson strictly competitive win-loss game. Then σ 1 σ 2 is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if, for each i j ∈ 1 2 , i = j,
Proof. The statement and proof of this theorem are obtained by a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 3.2 in Myerson (1991).
We refer to a mixed-strategyσ i which satisfies (1) as a maximin strategy for player i in G, and we refer to a mixed-strategyσ j which satisfies (2) as a minimax strategy for player j in G. Since player i wins if and only if player j loses,σ i is a maximin strategy for player i if and only ifσ i is a minimax strategy for player i. Hence, by the Minimax Theorem, σ 1 σ 2 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if σ 1 σ 2 is maximin-strategy profile.
In the next section, we consider a sequence G the set of supergame outcomes for player i. Let u i i∈N be a profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions where, for each i ∈ N, u i is a realvalued function on i . Then the supergame derived from G 1 G T and u i i∈N is given by
where N is the set of players, T is the number of stages and, for each t ∈ 1 T and each i ∈ N, A t i is the set of actions for player i at the tth stage,
is the set of possible histories at the tth stage, and player i's utility for terminal history a
for all t = s we have u i ω i > u i ω i . In other words, u i is monotone if, whenever two supergame outcomes differ only at a single stage s, then u i assigns a higher utility to the outcome in which player i wins at stage s than to the one where he loses.
A behavioral strategy for player i in the supergame can be written
The expected utility to player i in the supergame overall is U 1 i b h 1 , where h 1 is the null history, which we simply write as U i b . The behavioral strategy profileb is a Nash equilibrium of the supergame if for each i ∈ N and every b i ∈ B i ,
If b is a Nash equilibrium of the supergame, we say that h t = a
is an equilibrium-path history (or on the equilibrium path) if
Finally, we say thatb i is a maximin behavioral strategy for player i if
i.e.,b i maximizes player i's payoff under the assumption that, whatever behavioral strategy player i chooses, the behavioral strategies of the other players are chosen to minimize i's payoff. The payoff player i achieves from following a maximin behavioral strategy is the largest payoff that he can guarantee himself.
Nash Equilibrium
Our first result is that given a sequence of two-player strictly competitive win-loss games and given a profile of monotone von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions over supergame outcomes, then any Nash equilibrium of the supergame consisting of the sequential play of the stage games has the players (on the equilibrium path) play, at each stage, one of the stage game's Nash equilibria. All proofs are postponed to the appendix. 
. We assume that player i's preferences are monotone, i.e., u i
= ε i , and u i 1 i 2 i = 0, where δ i ε i ∈ 0 1 . Monotonicity is very weak, imposing almost no restriction on preferences over supergame outcomes except that winning would be better than losing at each stage.
The matching pennies game is a two-player strictly competitive win-loss game and has a unique Nash equilibrium in which each player chooses each of his actions with probability 1/2. By Corollary 3, the TRMPG also has a unique Nash equilibrium in which at each stage each player chooses each of his actions with probability 1/2. This conclusion holds regardless of whether player i prefers winning and then losing to losing and then winning (or vice versa), i.e., regardless of whether δ i > ε i or δ i < ε i . It also holds whether player i is risk averse in the number of wins (i.e., δ i = ε i > 1/2) or risk loving (i.e., δ i = ε i < 1/2).
As is clear from Example 1, even if each stage game is equivalent to a zero-sum game, the resulting supergame need not be. (The TRMPG is equivalent to a zero-sum game only if δ 1 + ε 2 = 1 and δ 2 + ε 1 = 1.) Indeed, the supergame need not even be strictly competitive. If both players are risk averse, for example, each would obtain a payoff greater than his Nash payoff if they agreed to coordinate their actions so that player 1 wins at the first stage and loses at the second stage. 8 
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Our next results apply to supergames consisting of the sequential play of win-loss (but not necessarily strictly competitive) stage games with any finite number of players. Theorem 2 establishes that any behavioral strategy profile in which the players, at each stage t, play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game G t is a subgame perfect (and Nash) equilibrium in the supergame for any profile of monotone utility functions over supergame outcomes. Theorem 2 leaves open the possibility that there are subgame perfect equilibria of the supergame in which for some history the players do not play a Nash equilibrium of the current stage. Theorem 3 shows that this is not possible when each stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium. In particular, given a sequence of win-loss games, each game having a unique Nash equilibrium, and given any profile of monotone utility functions over supergame outcomes, then the supergame consisting of the sequential play of the win-loss games has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium: at each stage, and both on and off the equilibrium path, the players play the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Together Theorems 2 and 3 establish the irrelevance of risk attitudes and time preferences in a broader class of games (i.e., game with more than two players) than did Theorem 1 when the solution concept is subgame perfection.
Maximin Strategies
Our next result applies to two-player games and establishes that playing at each stage t a maximin strategy of G t is a maximin behavioral strategy in the supergame. 
Our results for supergames consisting of the sequential play of two-player strictly competitive win-loss games establish that even though such games need not be zero sum, they do inherit some of the properties of the constituent stage games which are equivalent to zero-sum games: (i) it is a Nash equilibrium of the supergame when both players follow the maximin behavioral strategy of playing maximin at each stage (Theorem 2), and (ii) a player's expected utility is the same in every Nash equilibrium of the supergame, and equal to his maximin payoff (Theorem 4 and Corollary 1).
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss examples establishing the necessity of the assumptions of Theorem 1. We first show that it is essential that the stage games be strictly competitive.
Example 2. For t ∈ 1 2 let G t be the two-player win-loss game given below.
Each game G t has a unique Nash equilibrium 1/2H 1 . We show that the supergame derived from G 1 G 2 and u 1 u 2 has a Nash equilibrium in which, at the first stage, play is not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. In particular, the following behavioral strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium: at the first stage players 1 and 2 choose H Our next example establishes that it is also essential for Theorem 1 that the stage games be two-player games.
Example 3. For t ∈ 1 2 3 let G t be the three-player strictly competitive win-loss game given by
In G t player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix. Each game G t has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium H 3 . We show that the supergame derived from G t T t=1
and u i i∈N has a Nash equilibrium in which player 2 wins at the first stage. Specifically, consider the behavioral strategy profile in which at the first stage the players choose T In this Nash equilibrium, player 2 wins at the first stage and players 1 and 3 win at the second and third stage, respectively. Play at the first stage is not Nash in G 1 but is supported by punishing a deviation by player 1 (player 3) at the first stage with a certain loss in the second (third) stage.
The key feature of these examples is that each stage game has a Nash equilibrium in which some player's probability of winning is more than his minimax probability of winning.
9 Equilibrium play in the supergame, which is not Nash for some stage, is sustained by threats of future punishment.
CONCLUSION
We conclude by relating our results to the experimental literature on games. First, as in O'Neill (1987) , experiments by Rapoport and Boebel (1992) , Mookherjee and Sopher (1994), and Shachat (1996) have fixed pairs of subjects repeatedly play a win-loss game (with a unique Nash equilibrium in completely mixed strategies). Our results show that these papers have adequately controlled for the subjects' risk attitudes and time preferences in the supergame. Second, by identifying classes of stage games for which Nash (or subgame perfect) play in the supergame is at each stage a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, our results provide guidance on the design of experiments which control for risk attitudes and time preferences. Finally, our results allow the supergame to consist of a sequence of different stage games. This is useful to the experimenter who may wish to confront subjects with a sequence of different stage games, as when subjects alternate between choosing the row and the column in a nonsymmetric game.
APPENDIX
We begin by defining terms, stating two preliminary lemmas, and proving a lemma on continuation payoffs. Let
be a sequence of win-loss games and, for each i ∈ N, let u i i → be monotone. In the supergame derived from G t T t=1 and u i i∈N the expected utility of player i at stage t if player i's record of wins and losses is ω Proof. The proof is straightforward and is omitted. we have
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
The next lemma on continuation payoffs applies to supergames consisting of a sequence of two-player strictly competitive win-loss games. We show that at every stage, and regardless of the other player's behavioral strategy, by playing one of his maximin strategies at the current and every subsequent stage, a player obtains an expected utility at least as great as what he would obtain were both players to both employ maximin strategies at the current and subsequent stages. 
by Lemma 1, which together imply (8 
